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LIST OF PARTIES

Helen Knudsvig, an individual, is the Petitioner herein and
was the Defendant in the Trial Court and was Respondent in the
Utah Court of Appeals.

Western Capital and Securities, Inc. is the Respondent in
this action and was the Plaintiff in the Trial Court and the
Appellant in the Utah Court of Appeals.
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WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondent,
i

vs.

CASE NO: 890132

HELEN KNUDSVIG,
Petitioner.

(CATEGORY NO. 14)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY PETITIONER FOR REVIEW

POINT I.

Whether a violation of Federal Securities Law can

be raised as a mandatory counterclaim in a State Court action.
POINT II.

Whether a violation of Securities Dealers Rules

gives rise to a federal question or a state court action.

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court has been requested by the
Petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) and
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

The decision

of the Court of Appeals was entered on February 7, 1989, and
Petitioner's brief was mailed to Respondent's Counsel on April
10, 1989.

STATEMENT OF CASE
The facts as set forth in Petitioners Brief are a
recitation of the facts as contained in her brief before the
Court of Appeals.

The facts set forth by Petitioner in

Petitioner's Brief are incorrect and not substantiated by the
testimony at trial.

However, a lengthy recitation of the

errors is not necessary for a determination relating to the
present Petition.

The pertinent facts are that Respondent

filed an action in the State Courts requesting relief based on
breach of contract.

Petitioner filed a Counterclaim requesting

relief pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Securities and Exchange Rules promulgated thereunder.
Petitioner also requested relief pursuant to rules of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD).

The

lower court denied Respondent's claim and despite a Finding
that Petitioner had no actual damages, granted to Petitioner,
judgment for punitive damages.

The Respondent appealed the

ruling of the lower court.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of
Respondent's claim and determined sua sponte that the trial
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear or adjudicate any of the
issues raised in Petitioner's Counterclaim as those claims were
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based in total on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rules
promulgated thereunder.

The Court found that even if such

Counterclaim was a mandatory Counterclaim, Petitioner could not
raise a matter of violation of Federal Securities Laws in the
State Courts.

Jurisdiction of these matters is reserved

exclusively to the Federal Courts.

The Utah Court of Appeals also found that rules of the NASD
were adopted pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and therefore subject to the exclusive jurisdiction provisions
of that Act.

The Utah Court of Appeals therefore dismissed

Petitioner's Counterclaim and reversed the judgment against
Respondent.
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REPLY TO ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS PURSUANT TO THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS
WELL FOUNDED IN LAW AND NO REVIEW IS
NECESSARY
Petitioner contends that subparagraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Rule
43 of the Rules of The Utah Supreme Court provide a basis for
the granting of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

First/

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided a question
of State or Federal law that is in conflict with the decision
of this Court.

Petitioner claims the case of Cowen and Co. v.

Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984) is in
conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals.

However,

the Petitioner never states in what manner the Cowen case is in
conflict.

The Court in Cowen made no determination as to the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over matters
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and merelystated what are the duties of a Securities Broker-Dealer
pursuant to the NASD rules.

The Court in Cowen did not enforce

the NASD rules, but only referred to the rules to determine the
responsibility of Cowen and Co. which resulted in damages
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awarded to Cowen and Co.

The Cowen case does not in any manner

conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
present case.

The Petitioner further indicates that the Court of Appeals
should have remanded the matter to the trial court to find if
relief could have been granted based on a State claim.

The

Petitioner in her Counterclaim and throughout the trial never
raised an issue of State claims or questions, but based her
action on Federal claims.

A remand by the Court of Appeals

would have been an error.

Petitioner further claims that the Court of Appeals
determined an important question in the conflict of Federal and
State law which should be settled by the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah.

While the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

may not have specifically determined the issue of exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over claims pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the issue has been determined
by numerous other courts including the Tenth Circuit.
case

of deHass v. Empire Petroleum Co..

In the

435 F.2d 1223 (1970) at

page 1231, the Tenth Circuit specifically stated, "All actions
under Rule 10B-5 must be brought in the Federal Courts, 15
U.S.C. § 78aa. . . ."

Even though the present case included
- 5 -

alleged violations of Rules 10B-5 and 10B-10, the decision in
the deHass case is applicable and squarely on point in that 15
U.S.C. § 78aa on which the deHass court rendered its decision
states:
"The district courts of the United States
. . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder. . . . Any suit or
action to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder. . .may be brought in
any such district or in the district wherein
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant
. . .

•

The question of exclusive jurisdiction is specifically set
forth in the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 and was
specifically adopted by the deHass court for the Tenth Circuit
and has been adopted by numerous other courts. (Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th
Cir. 1985); Alkoff v. Gold, 611 F.Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Kinsev v. Nestor Exploration Ltd.- 1981A, 604 F.Supp. 1365,
1368-69 (E.D. Wash 1985); Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F.Supp. 829,
839 (N.D. Ohio 1983).

The Petitioner states that one of the grounds on which the
Petition for Certiorari should be granted is that the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call
- 6 -

for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.
The Defendant does not argue this particular issue.

However,

the decision of the Court of Appeals is clearly in line with
accepted judicial pronouncements and the statutory law, and
therefore no grounds exist for Writ of Certiorari pursuant to
this portion of Rule 43.

POINT II.
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS, INC. WAS CREATED PURSUANT TO THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND RULES
PROMULGATED THEREUNDER ARE MANDATED PURSUANT
TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND
FEDERAL COURTS THEREFORE HAVE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION.
Petitioner argues that Federal Courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and absent a federal question, jurisdiction is not
granted in the Federal Courts.

Petitioner goes on to misstate

the Cowen and Co. case, supra.

The NASD is an organization

organized pursuant to specific statutory authorization of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Section 15A.

Rules

promulgated by the NASD are promulgated pursuant to and
mandated by Section 15A(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

The express language of Securities Exchange Act of 1934

§ 27, as set forth hereinabove, specifically grants
jurisdiction to the District Courts of the United States for
- 7 -

violations of "the rules and regulations thereunder* . . ."
Therefore, by statute, Congress has specifically granted
jurisdiction to the Federal Courts and more importantly, has
specifically granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal
Courts for alleged violations of such rules.

The Petitioner again quotes the Cowen case, supra, and
claims that this Court has previously decided this issue on
appeal.

However, the Petitioner never sets forth where in the

Cowen case this Court made any such determination.

Petitioner

apparently mistakes the Court's quote of an NASD rule to be a
determination by this Court that State courts have jurisdiction
over enforcement of those rules.

The Cowen case does not make

any such holding.
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CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled in the present case.
The decision by the Court of Appeals is amply supported by
statutory and case law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals

is not in conflict with the decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court.

Therefore no basis exists for the granting of a Writ of

Certiorari in this matter, and the Petition should be dismissed
with costs awarded to the Respondent.

DATED this 10th day of May, 1989.

S)
CrajrO^McCull^uyh
—»
Attorney for Respondent

CDN9133m
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1989 I mailed
four true and correct copies of the above and foregoing REPLY
TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI by placing the same in the
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following:

Gerald A. Wight
Attorney for Petitioner
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401

- 10 -

Rule 43 of the Utah Supreme Court

Rule 43. Considerations governing review of
certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor
wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in a
way that is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court as to call for an exercise of this
court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or federal
law which has not been, but should be, settled by
this court.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 15A

REGISTERED SECURITIES ASSOCIATIONS
15A. (a) An association of brokers and dealers may be
registered as a national securities association pursuant to subsection
(b), or as an affiliated securities association pursuant to subsection
(d), under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided in this
section and in accordance with the provisions of section 19(a) of this
title, by filing with the Commission an application for registration in
such form as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe containing the
rules of the association and such other information and documents as
the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors,
SECTION

(b) An association of brokers and dealers shall not be registered
as a national securities association unless the Commission determines
that—
(1) By reason of the number and geographical distribution
of its members and the scope of their transactions, such association will be able to carry out the purposes of this section,
(2) Such association is so organized and has the capacity to
be able to carry out the purposes of this title and to comply, and
(subject to any rule or order of the Commission pursuant to
section 17(d) or 19(g)(2) of this title) to enforce compliance by
its members and persons associated with its members, with the
provisions of this title, the rules and regulations thereunder, the
rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the rules
of the association.
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (g) of this section, the rules of the association provide that any registered
broker or-dealer may become a member of such association and
any person may become associated with a member thereof.

(4) The rules of the association assure a fair representation
of its members in the selection of its directors and administration
of its affairs and provide that one or more directors shall be
representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with
a member of the association, broker, or dealer.
(5) The rules of the association provide for the equitable
allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other charges among
members and issuers and other persons using any facility or
system which the association operates or controls.
(6) The rules of the association are designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just
and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating
transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect
the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market
system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public
interest; and are not designed to permit unfair discrimination
between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, to fix minimum
profits, to impose any schedule or fix rates of commissions,
allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged by its members,
or to regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by this title
matters not related to the purposes of this title or the administration of the association.
(7) The rules of the association provide that (subject to any
rule or order of the Commission pursuant to section 17(d) or
19(g) (2) of this title) its members and persons associated with its
members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation of any
provision of this title, the rules or regulations thereunder, the
rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or the rules
of the association, by expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure, being suspended or
barred from being associated with a member, or any other fitting
sanction.
(8) The rules of the association are in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (h) of this section, and, in general,
provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members and
persons associated with members, the denial of membership to
any person seeking membership therein, the barring of any
person from becoming associated with a member thereof, and the
prohibition or limitation by the association of any person with
respect to access to services offered by the association or a
member thereof.
(9) The rules of the association do not impose any burden
on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of this title.

(10) The requirements of subsection (c), insofar as these
may be applicable, are satisfied.
(11) The rules of the association include provisions governing the form and content of quotations relating to securities
sold otherwise than on a national securities exchange which may
be distributed or published by any member or person associated
with a member, and the persons to whom such quotations may be
supplied. Such rules relating to quotations shall be designed to
produce fair and informative quotations, to prevent fictitious or
misleading quotations, and to promote orderly procedures for
collecting, distributing and publishing quotations.
(c) The Commission may permit or require the rules of an
association applying for registration pursuant to subsection (b), to
provide for the admission of an association registered as an affiliated
securities association pursuant to subsection (d), to participation in
said applicant association as an affiliate thereof, under terms permitting such powers and responsibilities to such affiliate, and under such
other 'appropriate terms and conditions, as may be provided by the
rules of said applicant association, if such rules appear to the Commission to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors and to carry out the purposes of this section.
The duties and powers of the Commission with respect to any national
securities association or any affiliated association shall in no way be
limited by reason of any such affiliation.
(d) An applicant association shall not be registered as an affiliated securities association unless it appears to the Commission that—
(1) such association, notwithstanding that it does not satisfy
the requirements set forth in paragraph (1) of subsection (b),
will, forthwith upon the registration thereof, be admitted to
affiliation with an association registered as a national securities
association pursuant to said subsection (b), in the manner and
under the terms and conditions provided by the rules of said
national securities association in accordance with subsection (c);
and
(2) such association and its rules satisfy the requirements set
forth in paragraphs (2) to (10) inclusive and paragraph (12), of
subsection (b); except that in the case of any such association any
restrictions upon membership therein of the type authorized by
paragraph (3) of subsection (D) shall not be less stringent than in
the case or the national securities association with which such
association is to be affiliated.
(e)(1) The rules of a registered securities association may
provide that no member thereof shall deal with any nonmember
professional (as defined in paragraph (2) of this subsection) except at
the same prices, for the same commissions or fees, and on the same
terms and conditions as are by such member accorded to the general
public.

(2) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "nonmember
professional" shall include (A) with respect to transactions in securities other than municipal securities, any registered broker or dealer
who is not a member of any registered securities association, except
such a broker or dealer who deals exclusively in commercial paper,
bankers' acceptances and commercial bills, and (B) with respect to
transactions in municipal securities, any municipal securities dealer
(other than a bank or division or department of a bank) who is not a
member of any registered securities association and any municipal
securities broker who is not a member of any such association.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be so construed or applied as
to prevent (A) any member of a registered securities association from
granting to any other member of any registered securities association
any dealer's discount, allowance, commission, or special terms, in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, or (B) any member
of a registered securities association or any municipal securities dealer
which is a bank or a division or department of a bank from granting to
any member of any registered securities association or any such
municipal securities dealer any dealer's discount, allowance, commission, or special terms in connection with the purchase or sale of
municipal securities: Provided, however, That the granting of any
such discount, allowance, commission, or special terms in connection
with the purchase or sale of municipal securities shall be subject to
rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board adopted pursuant
to section 15B(b)(2)(K) of this title.
(f)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection,
nothing in this section shall be construed to apply with respect to any
transaction by a registered broker or dealer in any exempted security.
(2) A registered securities association may adopt and implement
rules applicable to members of such association (A) to enforce
compliance by registered brokers and dealers with applicable provisions of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder, (B) to
provide that its members and persons associated with its members
shall be appropriately disciplined, in accordance with subsections
(b)(7), (b)(8), and (h) of this section, for violation of applicable
provisions of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder, (C)
to provide for reasonable inspection and examination of the books and
records of registered brokers and dealers, (D) to provide for the
matters described in paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4), and (b)(5) of this
section, (E) to implement the provisions of subsection (g) of this
section, and (F) to prohibit fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, and
false advertising.
(3) Nothing in subsection (b) (6) or (b) (11) of this section shall
be construed to permit a registered securities association to make
rules concerning any transaction by a registered broker of dealer in a
municipal security.

(g) (1) A registered securities association shall deny membership
to any person who is not a registered broker or dealer.
(2) A registered securities association may, and in cases in which
the Commission, by order, directs as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors shall, deny membership to any registered broker or dealer, and bar from becoming
associated with a member any person, who is subject to a statutory
disqualification. A registered securities association shall file notice
with the Commission not less than 30 days prior to admitting any
registered broker or dealer to membership or permitting any person
to oecome associated with a member, if the association knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that such broker or
dealer or person was subject to a statutory disqualification. The notice
shall be in such form and contain such information as the Commission,
by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
(3) (A) A registered securities association may deny membership
to, or condition the membership of, a registered broker or dealer if (i)
such broker or dealer does not meet such standards of financial
responsibility or operational capability or such broker or dealer or any
natural person associated with such broker or dealer does not meet
such standards of training, experience and competence as are prescribed by the rules of the association or (ii) such broker or dealer or
person associated with such broker or dealer has engaged and there is
a reasonable likelihood he will again engage in acts or practices
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. A registered
securities association may examine and verify the qualifications of an
applicant to become a member and the natural persons associated
with such an applicant in accordance with procedures established by
the rules of the association.
(B) A registered securities association may bar a natural person
from becoming associated with a member or condition the association
of a natural person with a member if such natural person (i) does not
meet such standards of training, experience, and competence as are
prescribed by the rules of the association or (ii) has engaged and
there is a reasonable likelihood he will again engage in acts or
practices inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. A
registered securities association may examine and verify the qualifications of an applicant to become a person associated with a member in
accordance with procedures established by the rules of the association
and require a natural person associated with a member, or any class of
such natural persons, to be registered with the association in accordance with procedures so established.
(C) A registered securities association may bar any person from
becoming associated with a member if such person does not agree (i)
to supply the- association with such information with respect to its
relationship and dealings with the member as may be specified in the

rules of the association and (ii) to permit examination of its books and
records to verify the accuracy of any information so supplied.
(D) Nothing in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph
shall oe construed to permit a registered securities association to deny
membership to or condition the membership of, or bar any person
from becoming associated with or condition the association of any
person with, a broker or dealer that engages exclusively in transactions in exempted securities.
(4) (A) A registered securities association may deny membership
to, or condition the membership of, a government securities broker or
government securities dealer if such government securities broker or
government securities dealer (i) does not meet standards of financial
responsibility under rules adopted pursuant to section 15C(b) (1) (A)
of this title, or (ii) has engaged and there is a reasonable likelihood
that it will again engage in any conduct or practice which would
subject such government securities broker or government securities
dealer to sanctions under section 15C(c) of this title. A registered
securities association may establish procedures including examination
of the books and records of government securities brokers and government securities dealers to verify compliance with the provisions of
this title and the rules thereunder.
(B) A registered securities association may bar any person from
becoming associated with a member or condition the association of a
person with a member (i) if such person has engaged in any conduct
or practice and there is a reasonable likelihood that such person will
again engage in any conduct or practice which would subject such
person to sanctions under section 15C(c) of this title, or (ii) if such
person does not agree to supply such association with such information with respect to its relationship and dealings with the member as
may be specified in the rules of the association and to permit examination of its books and records to verify the accuracy thereof.
(5) A registered securities association may deny membership to a
registered broker or dealer not engaged in a type of business in which
the rules of the association require members to be engaged: Provided,
however, That no registered securities association may deny membership to a registered broker or dealer by reason of the amount of such
type of business done by such broker or dealer or the other types of
business in which he is engaged.
(h) (1) In any proceeding by a registered securities association to
determine whether a member or person associated with a member
should be disciplined (other than a summary proceeding pursuant to
paragraph (3) of this subsection) the association shall bring specific
charges, notify such member or person of, and give him an opportunity to defend against, such charges, and keep a record. A determination by the association to impose a disciplinary sanction shall be
supported by a statement setting forth—

(A) any act or practice in which such member or person
associated with a member has been found to have engaged, or
which such member or person has been found to have omitted;
(B) the specific provision of this title, the rules or regulations thereunder, the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or the rules of the association which any such act or
practice, or omission to act, is deemed to violate; and
(C) the sanction imposed and the reason therefor.
(2) In any proceeding by a registered securities association to
determine whether a person shall be denied membership, barred from
becoming associated with a member, or prohibited or limited with
respect to access to services offered by the association or a member
thereof (other than a summary proceeding pursuant to paragraph (3)
of this subsection), the association shall notify such person of and give
him an opportunity to be heard upon, the specific grounds for denial,
bar, or prohibition or limitation under consideration and keep a
record. A determination by the association to deny membership, bar a
person from becoming associated with a member, or prohibit or limit a
person with respect to access to services offered by the association or
a member thereof shall be supported by a statement setting forth the
specific grounds on which the denial, bar, or prohibition or limitation
is based.
(3) A registered securities association may summarily (A) suspend a member or person associated with a member who has been and
is expelled or suspended from any self-regulatory organization or
barred or suspended from being associated with a member of any selfregulatory organization, (B) suspend a member who is in such financial or operating difficulty that the association determines and so
notifies the Commission that the member cannot be permitted to
continue to do business as a member with safety to investors, creditors, other members, or the association, or (C) limit or prohibit any
person with respect to access to services oflPered by the association if
subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph is applicable to such
person or, in the case of a person who is not a member, if the
association determines that such person does not meet the qualification requirements or other prerequisites for such access and such
person cannot be permitted to continue to have such access with
safety to investors, creditors, members, or the association. Any person
aggrieved by any such summary action shall be promptly afforded an
opportunity for a hearing by tne association in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection. The Commission, by order, may stay any such summary action on its own motion
or upon application by any person aggrieved thereby, if the Commission determines summarily or after notice and opportunity for hearing
(which hearing mav consist solely of the submission of affidavits or
presentation or oral arguments) that such stay is consistent with the
public interest and the protection of investors.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 27

JURISDICTION OF OFFENSES AND SUITS
SECTION 27. The district courts of the United States, the district
court of the United States for the District of Columbia, and the United
States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of
this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any
criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to
enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such title or rules and
regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district
of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant
may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered shall be subject to
review as provided in sections 128 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as
amended (U.S.C., title 28, sees. 225 and 347). No costs shall be
assessed for or against the Commission in any proceeding under
this title brought by or against it in the Supreme Court or such
other courts.
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GARFF, Judge:
Plaintiff and appellant, Western Capital and Securities,
Inc. (Western), filed an action to recover $5,402.20 damages
incurred when defendant and respondent, Helen Knudsvig, failed
or refused to deliver a stock certificate after she allegedly
requested Western to sell stock for her. Knudsvig counterclaimed, alleging that Western had violated Rules 10b-5 and
10b-10 promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, and various rules of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD). We affirm in part and reverse in
part.
Western is a broker-dealer registered with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Utah
Securities Division. Knudsvig is a sixty-one-year-old customer
who occasionally purchased penny stocks through Western and
other brokerage firms. The trial court found that she was not
a sophisticated investor and only traded a few hundred dollars
worth of stock per year.

The conditions in the brokers' contract between Western and
Knudsvig required settlement of all transactions five days
after a sale or purchase. The relevant provisions read:
4. All transactions shall be settled by
the fifth full business day following the
sale or purchase . . . and at your option,
if you shall not have received cash for
the securities purchased for my account or
delivery of the securities sold for my
account, appropriately endorsed and in
proper negotiable form, on the fifth full
business day following the purchase or
sale, as the case may be, you shall have
the right, either with or without demand
upon or notice to me, such demand or
notice being expressly waived, to close my
account, or any trade or transaction
included herein on any such exchange or
market, at public or private sale, or by
public or private purchase, with or
without advertising such sale or purchase,
such advertising being hereby expressly
waived, and such sale or purchase may be
made in one or a series of sales or
purchases as you may elect.
5. You are authorized to accept from me
oral or telephonic orders for the purchase
or sale of securities and in consideration
of your acceptance of this agreement, I
hereby waive any defense that I may have
because any such order was not in writing
or evidenced by a memorandum in writing as
required by the Statute of Frauds, or
other statute.
9. Communications of every kind referring
in any way to my account may be sent to me
at my address given hereon . . . and all
communications so sent, whether by mail,
telegraph, messenger or otherwise, shall
be deemed given to me personally whether
actually received by me or not.
Kim Johnson, secretary/treasurer of Western, testified that
this language meant that, on the fifth business day following

88019a-C&

2.

the sale or purchase, Western had the option (1) to close the
transaction by buying in, or (2) to allow the contract to
remain open.
In about June 1983, Knudsvig purchased 20,000 shares of
Venture Consolidated, Inc. (Venture) for $200 through Western.
This offering was a new issue of penny stock for which Western
was a market maker. Knudsvig claimed that she never received a
stock certificate, but had attempted to obtain a duplicate
certificate in August or September of 1983 and also in November
of 1984.
In July 1984, Venture shareholders approved an acquisition
and merger with several Big 0 Tire franchises. They changed
the name of the corporation to Tires, Inc. and approved a 20 to
1 reverse stock split. On September 14, 1984, Louis Babcock,
Western's Ogden representative, who was acquainted with
Knudsvig through past dealings, notified Knudsvig that her
Venture shares had increased in value from $.01 to $.17 per
share, and asked her if she wanted to sell. Knudsvig
declined. Later, excited about the rise in value of her stock,
she unsuccessfully attempted to contact Babcock. She then
contacted Western's office in Salt Lake City and spoke to
Richard Davis. After a lengthy discussion, Davis concluded
that Knudsvig wanted to sell her stock and wished to credit the
sales commission to Babcock. While Knudsvig was still on the
telephone, Davis contacted Richard C. Parker, Western's
executive vice president, for instructions on how to consummate
the transaction, which was complicated by Knudsvig's confusion,
the lack of a stock certificate, and having to credit the
commission to* Babcock. Parker, in spite of these difficulties,
immediately approved the purchase from Knudsvig for $.16114 per
share through Western's market making account. Davis returned
to the phone, informed Knudsvig of the sale and selling price,
and told her that she had to mail in the stock certificate. He
informed her that it was possible for a trade to take place
without possession of the certificate since she had ten [sic]
days after the trade to bring in the certificate. Parker
stated that the sale was handled in this manner because
Knudsvig was an established, sophisticated customer who had
paid for and delivered stock in a timely manner over a long
period of time.
Knudsvig disputes Davis's statements, although her
testimony is somewhat unclear. Initially, she denied that this
phone call ever took place, but then admitted to making the
call. She denied that she ever requested the sale of her
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stock. She further testified that she had no intention of
making a sale, thought that Western could not sell her stock
without possession of the certificate, and in 1983, Western had
cancelled a similar sale because she could not find her stock
certificate. The trial court found that she had assumed there
could be no final sale until she was able to get a stock
certificate.
Knudsvig stated that, at this point, she was unaware that
her stock had been sold because she never received a written
confirmation of the sale. Western, however, stated that,
within the five day period following the sale, it had sent a
written confirmation to Knudsvig1s address. Western did not
close Knudsvigfs account for seventy-five days after the
purported sale, at which time the value of the stock had risen
to $8.00 per share.1 Johnson testified that Western had
waited for this unusually long period of time to cover
Knudsvig's short position because she was a good customer, she
had indicated that she was replacing the certificate, and
Johnson thought that he was acting in Knudsvig's best
interest. Western's eventual buy-in resulted in a $5,402.20
deficit in Knudsvig's account, which is the basis for Western's
complaint.
In its memorandum decision, entered on October 23, 1986,
the trial court found that Knudsvig continued to be the owner
of the stock, that the alleged sale never occurred, and that
Western's activity was unconscionable. The trial court
dismissed Western's complaint and awarded punitive damages to
Knudsvig in the amount of $10,000.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred: (1) in
finding that Knudsvig did not authorize the sale of her stock;
(2) in finding that Western violated Rules 10b-5 and lOb-10 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (3) in finding that
Western violated various National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) rules, and in finding that there is a private
right of action for violation of NASD rules; and (4) in
awarding punitive damages.
The trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on
appeal unless they "are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
1. At the time of the trial, October 16, 1986, the value of
the stock was approximately $30.00 per share.
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definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.H
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); see also Cove
View Excavating & Const. Co. v. Flvnn, 758 P.2d'474, 477: (Utah
Ct. App. 1988). Factual findings are given considerable
deference because of the trial court's ability to assess the
witnesses1s credibility. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Power Systems,
97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36; Southland Corp. v. Potter. 760 P.2d
?20, 321 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Findings of fact are clearly
erroneous.if the appellant can show that they are without
adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an
erroneous view of the law. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987).
In carefully examining the record, we note that there is
much conflicting evidence and inconsistent testimony,
especially regarding Knudsvig's telephone call to Western, in
which Knudsvig purportedly authorized the sale of her stock,
and regarding whether or not Knudsvig received written
confirmation of the alleged sale from Western. The trial court
found that Knudsvig had no intention of selling her stock, that
she was the rightful owner of the 20,000 shares of Venture
stock, and that Western failed to establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that written notice of the transaction was
mailed to Knudsvig.
In essence, Western argues that the trial court should have
believed its evidence rather than Knudsvig1s. However, the
clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's
findings that the sale was not authorized and did not take
place, and we defer to the trial court's advantaged position in
evaluating the witnesses's demeanor and credibility. We find
no error in the court's rulings on this issue.2
JURISDICTION
Western asserts that the trial court erred in finding that
it violated Rules 10b-5 and 10b-10 of the Securities Exchange
2. Although Knudsvig raises affirmative defenses to Western's
action under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-301, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b-10, and § 12 of the NASD manual, we
do not consider them because: (1) we sustain the trial court's
finding that no sale of the securities occurred, thus obviating
the need for a defense to the sale, and (2) the parties -.did not
raise the issue on appeal.
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Act of 1934 and various NASD rules. Before we examine the
merits of this argument, however, we raise sua sponte the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. -.As stated in
Carreathers v. Carreathers, 654 P.2d 871 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982),
[t]he parties have not raised the issue of
. . . subject matter jurisdiction . . . in
the trial court or in this appeal.
However, the question of subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
an action without an assignment of error,
and an appellate court may decide a
question of subject matter jurisdiction
where it appears on the face of the record.
Id. at 871; see also Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Furthermore, Mthis Court may, on its own
motion, determine lack of jurisdiction.H Bailey v. Sound Lab,
Inc., 694 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); see also State v.
Brandimart, 720 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Haw. 1986). -Jurisdiction
cannot be conferred upon this Court by stipulation" of the
parties. Bailey, 649 P.2d at 1044.
Exclusive jurisdiction over causes of action stemming from
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is vested in
the federal courts. The 1934 Act, at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1981),
states in relevant part:
The district courts of the United States
. . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder. . . . Any
suit or action to enforce any liability or
duty created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder . . . may be
brought in any such district or in the
district wherein the defendant is found or
is an inhabitant . . . .
Federal courts generally interpret this statute to mean what it
says: federal jurisdiction is exclusive over actions brought
to enforce the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.
1985); DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231
(10th Cir. 1971); Alkoff v. Gold, 611 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Kinsev v. Nestor Exploration Ltd,—1981A, 604 F. Supp.
1365, 1368-69 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp.
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829, 839 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Klecklev v. Hebert, 464 So. 2d 39,
4-> (La. Ct. App. 1985) .
There is a split in authority as to whether the 1934 Act
can be used as an affirmative defense in state actions. Some
jurisdictions assert that state courts do not have jurisdiction
to adjudicate federal securities lavrquestions brought under
the 1934 Act, even when raised as an affirmative defense.
Instead/ they Msquarely endorseH the proposition that M[w]here
exclusive jurisdiction exists, only the federal courts can
provide affirmative relief." Alkoff, 611 F. Supp. at 66
(quoting L e w v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960/ 967 (2nd Cir. 1980)).
While recognizing that the statute precludes state court
adjudication of direct claims based upon the violation of the
1934 Act/ other jurisdictions allow state courts to consider
claims based on the 1934 Act which are raised as affirmative
defenses in state court actions. Andrea Theatres, Inc. v.
Theatre Confections, Inc., 787 F.2d 59/ 63 (2nd Cir. 1986);
Scope Indus, v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 576 F.
Supp. 373/ 379 (CD. Cal. 1983); Birenbaum v. Bache & Co., 555
S.W.2d 513/ 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
Even so, these jurisdictions do not allow state courts to
grant affirmative relief to a defendant who prevails on such
federal claims,. but# instead/ force the defendant to go to
federal court to seek affirmative relief. Andrea Theatres, 787
F.2d at 63. Further, these jurisdictions distinguish between
H
caseS/M wherein state determination is precluded, and
"questions/- which the state may adjudicate, which arise under
the 1934 Act. Scope Indus., 576 F. Supp. at 378-79; Birenbaum,
555 S.W.2d at 515. The Birenbaum court adopted the United
States Supreme Court's reasoning regarding jurisdiction over
patent claims in making this distinction:
There is a clear distinction between a
case and a question arising under the
patent laws. The former arises when the
plaintiff in his opening pleading—be it a
bill, complaint, or declaration—sets up a
right under the patent laws as ground for
a recovery. Of such the state courts have
no jurisdiction. The latter may appear in
the plea or answer or in the testimony.
The determination of such question is not
beyond the competency of the state
tribunals.
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Birenbaum, 555 S.W.2d at 515 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gaslight &
Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897) (emphasis in Birenbaum^.
The Birenbaum court found that the state court was competent to
adjudicate a 10b-5 violation issue because it Honly appeared by
way of defense, it is merely a question in the case, rather
than a claim for relief.M Birenbaum, 555 S.W.2d at 515.
Similarly, the Scope Industries court, in determining that
the state court had jurisdiction to consider a defense based on
the 1934 Act, also distinguished between cases, which the state
court could not adjudicate, and questions, which the state
court was competent to consider. It stated that whether a
"colorable claim existed under the Exchange Act at the
commencement of the underlying action is different in kind than
the question of whether or not Scope violated the Exchange Act,
as alleged in the underlying action.1* Scope Indus., 756 F.
Supp. at 378-79.
We do not find it necessary today to decide which of these
lines of cases we will follow. Although Knudsvig asserted Rule
10b-10 as an affirmative defense, her claims under the 1934 Act
were brought in the form of a counterclaim for violation of
Rule 10b-5 as well as Rule 10b-10. Thus, even under the more
liberal authority, she does not qualify jurisdictionally.
These claims are in the nature of a case rather than a question
and, accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to consider them.
VIOLATION OF NASD RUL$S
Section 15A(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1981), requires securities
associations, such as the NASD, to adopt disciplinary rules.
See Emmons v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532
F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Section 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)
requires that M[e]very self-regulatory organization shall
comply with the provisions of this chapter, the rules and
regulations thereunder, and its own rules." Thus, the NASD
comes under the regulatory provisions of the Act and is subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction provision of 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a).
Therefore, any action based on violation of NASD rules must be
brought in the federal courts.
That Knudsvig1s counterclaim may be Construed to be
compulsory under Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a) still does not confer
jurisdiction upon this Court to hear the merits of her claim.
"A party is not required to file a compulsory counterclaim in
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the district court if the claim exceeds the jurisdiction of
that court." Brewer v. Bradley, 431 So. 2d 544, 545 (Ala, Civ.
App. 1983).3
To summarize, Knudsvig's counterclaim relies exclusively
upon alleged violations of the 1934 Act and NASD rules, which
are regulated under the 1934 Act, all of which come under
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Once we have determined that
w^ have no jurisdiction over a claim, all we may do is dismiss
the action. See In re Marriage of Passiales, 144 111. App. 3d
629, 494 N.E.2d 541, 547, 98 111. Dec. 419 (1986); Wells v.
Noldon, 679 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Therefore, we
dismiss Knudsvig's entire counterclaim.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The trial court dismissed Western's complaint and, even
though the court failed to find any actual damages stemming
from the alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in Knudsvig's counterclaim, it awarded punitive damages to
Knudsvig. Since we have found that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim, it follows that
Knudsvig's associated request for damages fails. See Howard v.
Miller, 108 111. App. 3d 1, 438 N.E.2d 680, 685, 63 111. Dec.
749 (1982); see also DeWitt County Pub. Elder. Comm'n v. County
Of DeWitt, 128 111. App. 3d 11, 469 N.E.2d 689, 694, 83 111.
Dec. 82 (1984). Further, Ma court without jurisdiction cannot
order affirmative relief.M Chadwick v. Pillard, 536 F. Supp.
73, 75 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). Therefore, the trial court could not
award punitive damages.

3. Federal practice is similar: If a federal court has
jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim, it will also have
jurisdiction over a counterclaim arising from the same action
or occurrence. However, "if the counterclaim is entirely
beyond the competence of the federal courts, as for example, an
action precluded by sovereign immunity or one involving a
purely probate matter, the court may not adjudicate it even if
the claim would otherwise be treated as compulsory." Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure. § 1414 at 72 (1971).
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GERALD S. WIGHT, #3461
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN CAPITAL AND
SECURITIES, INC.,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
-vsHELEN KNUDSVIG,

CIVIL NO: 92290

Defendant.
This matter having come before the Court for trial on
the 16th day of October, 1986, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the
Court having taken the matter under advisement at the close
of

testimony

and

oral

argument,

and

having

previously

rendered its Memorandum Decision and entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby award judgment as
follows:
1.

That the Complaint of the Plaintiff is dismissed

no cause of action.
2.
shares

JUDGMENT

That the Defendant is the sole owner of the 20
of

Venture

Consolidated

1

which

has

since^
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converted by the company to lf000 shares of Tires, Inc., and
has been at all times and places in that the Plaintiff has
not and does not have any claim whatsoever on said shares or
against the Defendant.
3.

That the Plaintiff has acted in violation of Rule

10B(5) and 10B(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the NASD Rules of which the Plaintiff is a member and
has further acted in a manner so as to deceive and cheat the
public in general and the Defendant in particular by its
involvement and hold and control over the subject corpo8
||D§
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ration with the knowledge and inside information of its
dealings in up coming business activities, and has used all
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such to the detriment and damage of the Defendant in attempting

to convert her stock, all in violation of all

applicable rules and regulations thus entitling the Defendant to judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of
$10,000.00 punitive damage in addition to costs of Court in
the amount of $35.00.
4.

It is further Ordered that Interwest Transfer or

any other entity which has previously been served with or
notified of any restraining order restraining the obtaining
of the certificate by the Defendant shall forthwith release
any such certificate and issue the same to the Defendant
upon appropriate application.
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DATED

this

i^>o

day of QfctpbeP, 1986.
/""\ BY THE' COURT:

HONORABLE JOHN F.//WAHLQUIST
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ^ 0

day of October,

1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing JUDGMENT by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage
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prepaid and addressed to the following:
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Craig F. McCullough
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, #528
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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